Keurig Dr Pepper – Strategic Update & Global Distribution
Challenges – 4 May 2021
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Specialist: Mario Magro (MM)
Title:
Moderator: Nyree Hinton (NH), Third Bridge Sector Analyst
Former VP, Sales & General Manager, Grocery East at Keurig Dr Pepper Inc
Agenda:
1. Operating dynamics for Keurig Dr Pepper (NYSE: KDP) across soft drinks, seltzers and flavoured
water
2. Competitive landscape – PepsiCo (NASDAQ: PEP) and Coca Cola (NYSE: KO)
3. Keurig Dr Pepper's innovation and limits of key trademarks
4. Global distribution challenges
5. K-Cup pod partnerships and category outlook
Contents
Q: Could you give an overview of the non-alcoholic beverage industry including the main categories, drivers
and top competitors as it relates to Dr Pepper?
3
Q: What are some of the industry’s biggest challenges? How has coronavirus played a role in changing these
dynamics?
4
Q: Could you outline Dr Pepper’s business lines and the different categories it operates in? How is the
company less exposed to certain channels than Coke and Pepsi?
4
Q: Could you elaborate on the US distribution landscape and the importance for a brand such as Dr Pepper
to get product to the consumer and retailer? It’s not only about competing when it comes to what consumers
want. What about the challenge of Pepsi and Coke controlling a significant proportion of the country’s
distribution?
5
Q: The distribution issue presumably isn’t confined to Dr Pepper – wouldn’t small start-ups also have
trouble if the weak distribution is controlled by a direct competitor? How has the overall industry responded
to the control over the distribution network? Has there been any regulatory push? Why isn’t this a bigger
issue?
5
Q: Why is that Dr Pepper would go through multiple channels to the same place?
6
Q: How does the retailer relationship play into Keurig Dr Pepper’s innovation, especially if retailers play safe
with Coke and Pepsi in the soft drink segment? What are the considerations around the health and wellness
segment given there’s less competition but an increasing store presence? Target and ShopRite have whole
sections dedicated to better-for-you and health and wellness. How does Keurig Dr Pepper think about
innovation when approaching retailers and product allocation?
6
Q: Could you expand on the success of Keurig’s coffee machines vs the coffee itself? Anecdotally, I don’t like
the taste of Keurig’s coffee so I buy Starbucks to use in a Keurig machine. What missteps would you highlight
7
around the quality of the actual coffee?
Q: What are the upcoming opportunities in coffee?
7
Q: To what extent has Keurig Dr Pepper leveraged its growth and retailer strength in coffee to gain more
exposure in other parts of the business? Did the company consider leveraging this market strength to build a
8
bigger presence in the soft drink segment?
Q: Could you elaborate on some of your comments about increasing efficiency and investing less in the retail
channel? How does it factor into Keurig Dr Pepper’s D2C approach and website or e-commerce build-out?
What is your outlook on the company’s strategy to focus on e-commerce and sales growth? Where will the
growth be?
8
Q: What are the opportunities for Dr Pepper and Keurig’s global ambitions?
9
Q: Which categories are trending positively in the US? What are your thoughts on Keurig expanding into one
of the new categories, such as seltzers or energy drinks, in a more efficient way? How have barriers to entry
changed in the beverage market for small start-ups and other competitors?
10
Q: What could be the biggest threat to Coke and Pepsi given their US dominance, strong distribution
pipeline, balance sheet for innovation and entrenched retailer relationships? What could be a disrupting
factor to those industry leaders? What technical innovation could help disrupt the market?
Q: Could you outline the sustainability and plastic issues and likely impact for big beverage companies?
10
11
Keurig Dr Pepper – Strategic Update & Global
Distribution Challenges
Transcription begins at 00:00:00 of the recorded material
NH: Welcome to Third Bridge Forum’s Interview entitled Keurig Dr Pepper – Strategic Update & Global
Distribution Challenges. I am Nyree Hinton and I will be facilitating today’s Interview with Mr Mario Magro,
former VP Sales and General Manager at Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.
Mario, before we get started with today’s Interview, please state I agree or I disagree to the following
statement: You understand the definition of material non-public information and agree not to disclose any
such information, or any other information which is confidential, during this Interview.
MM: I agree.
NH: Could you start with an overview of your background and previous roles you’ve held in the industry?
MM: As you said, my last role was Sales Vice President, General Manager of Grocery East, for Keurig Dr
Pepper, leading total portfolio of coffee and soft drinks. Before that, I was the sales and marketing Vice
President for Dr Pepper’s Snapple group, International. In Mexico, I spent 11 years in International, spent my
time in Mexico, leading all the commercial side for the Mexican business. Before that, I was the marketing
director for Dr Pepper International in the Caribbean and Latin America leading both the soft drink portfolio
and the juice, Mott’s, portfolio. Before that I was the Marketing Director for Latin America when we were
Cadbury Schweppes, Latin America. I joined the company in Argentina in 1996 as Marketing and Franchise
manager for Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay.
[00:02:18]
Q: Could you give an overview of the non-alcoholic beverage industry including the main categories, drivers
and top competitors as it relates to Dr Pepper?
MM: The non-alcoholic beverage industry changed in the last 10 years. Before, you have soft drinks and colas
leading the growth and leading the dollars. In general you know the market in the US, mainly, and since water
took the leadership, and supported by the health and wellness trend and the obesity pressure and the sugar
pressure over soft drink, now bottled water took the number one position in volume. Still, soft drinks are more
relevant in dollars for companies and retailers, but in volume, now water is taking the leadership. You see this
trend in different functional waters. The last trend that exploded in the US is the sparkling water. You see the
seltzers and the sparkling water category growing. Alternative beverages like isotonics and energy drinks also
growing ahead of soft drinks. You have now colas, flat or reducing diet growing, like Coke Zero leading the
growth. Everything is under the health and wellness trend and everything is supporting all the obesity and
calories concerned from consumers. This is the overall trend, so, everything from water, sparkling water,
functional water growing, and then regular soft drinks suffering in the market.
Private and confidential 3
[00:04:36]
Q: What are some of the industry’s biggest challenges? How has coronavirus played a role in changing these
dynamics?
MM: The challenge is, first of all, when you have Coke, Pepsi, Dr Pepper, having their core brand, the number
one brand under pressure, regular soft drinks. So, regular Coca Cola, regular Pepsi, regular Dr Pepper, as the
core brand, and now having challenges to grow. The whole organisation needs to change the mind, needs to
change the innovation, pipeline needs to change the focus, but sometimes it takes time because for many years
those brands were the star and those brands were growing and selling huge volumes, now being under
pressure, changing trends, moving your company to have more focus behind diets or water, and you don’t
have the expertise, you don’t have the skill. You don’t fill that. This is the main challenge. With COVID, the
battle for the space in the retailers was huge, because think about all the on-premise channel was closed. We
are talking about stadiums, universities, restaurants, all the volume that mainly Coke and Pepsi, they were
selling in those channels, all the channels were closed, so all the battles moved to the retailers, to the shelf. The
shelf, the space, was very limited, the execution was difficult because you don’t have the same support from
the employees going there, so it was a very critical situation from the industry, but I think for companies like
Dr Pepper, it was a positive trend, since Dr Pepper is weaker in other challenges, and it was relatively stronger
in retailers. Kind of, short-term gains. I know that they were selling everything. We were coming from single-
digit growth in grocery to double-digit growth last year. I think it’s short term. Once you return, not 100%
normal, but once you have the on-premise channel open, you have the stadiums you have the restaurants,
Coke and Pepsi will have an advantage vs Dr Pepper.
[00:07:42]
Q: Could you outline Dr Pepper’s business lines and the different categories it operates in? How is the
company less exposed to certain channels than Coke and Pepsi?
MM: I think the position of Keurig, the company as two big categories. Hot drinks or coffee, that is mainly
Keurig K-cups, coffee bags and coffee machines, and cold drinks, that is mainly all the Dr Pepper portfolio,
soft drinks, ice tea, Snapple, water, Core, Evian, juices, Mott’s, Hawaiian Punch, Clamato, energy drinks.
These are the core categories. Key brands in each portfolio in soft drink, Dr Pepper, Canada Dry, 7 Up,
Sunkist, Snapple, Mott’s. In the coffee side, owned brands, Keurig doing one thing, then you have some
franchise brands like Starbucks, Dunkin’ Donuts. Why Dr Pepper has an advantage is during COVID, well, you
know that in order to get in restaurants, stadiums, universities, sometimes you have to pay exclusivities, so
you have to invest. The bigger companies, Coke, Pepsi, they have more budgets to get there, more machines,
more (inaudible 09.35) mix, more vending machines. For Dr Pepper, it was difficult was get, and then Keurig,
with all the short-term financial mindset, they didn’t like to invest. In relative terms, Dr Pepper was stronger
in grocery and clubs and regular retailer, traditional retail than on premise market. That’s the reason why
maybe this trend, it was possible for Dr Pepper. Also, the e-commerce. Keurig.com was well developed, the e-
commerce, especially for the coffee. Now having all the families at home ordering from home, it was a big
boost for the coffee side, too.
NH: Do you think this was an opportunity for Keurig to expand into the weaker channels and build a presence
for a potential rebound? How did Dr Pepper explore the dynamics to seek out any opportunities?
MM: No, because the mindset is on the contrary – Keurig, Dr Pepper is reducing investment in channels, is
reducing frequencies. Everything is efficiency, everything is led by revenue management and finance. They are
reducing frequency, so delivery reducing service. The partnership with big retailers will be a challenge,
because of that, because on the other side you have retailers asking for more investment, more service, fill
rates, reducing out of stocks, It’s a contrary force. You like to have bigger margins, less people, less investment.
On the other side, your retailers are asking for more. In the store you have four or five merchandisers from
coke working every day and you have one or two merchandisers for Keurig Dr Pepper growing every other day
or even two or three times per week. When you see the shelf, you realise that you cannot compete with that.
Not even in the grocery channel, not even in the class, you are strong. They are not going to invest in other
Private and confidential 4
channels, no premise or stadiums or universities, that you need to invest that. I don’t see that. On the other
side, part of the execution of Dr Pepper is done by independent systems, independent bottling, they are very
weak. They are suffering. Some of them, they cannot invest more because I think that they are in the break-
even side of the business. If you think about the DSD operation, the direct system delivery owned by Dr
Pepper, is suffering, imagine independent system that is weaker or not able to invest.
NH: Are you saying the D2C approach for Dr Pepper is weak?
MM: No, the direct delivery to grocery is weaker than Coke and Pepsi.
[00:13:33]
Q: Could you elaborate on the US distribution landscape and the importance for a brand such as Dr Pepper to
get product to the consumer and retailer? It’s not only about competing when it comes to what consumers
want. What about the challenge of Pepsi and Coke controlling a significant proportion of the country’s
distribution?
MM: I totally agree. This is one of the weaknesses of Dr Pepper, thinking about long-term. You have your
number one brand, that two-thirds of the volume is done by your competitors. I’ll give you an example. If you
like to launch innovation or line extensions, it’s very difficult because yes, it’s Coke and Pepsi, due to the
franchise contract, they have the obligation and they have execution standards for regular Dr Pepper. Once
you move to Diet Pepper, now launching Dr Pepper Zero, all flavours, Dr Pepper Cherry, Diet Cherry, you
don’t see these skews executed well anywhere in the blue and red system. First of all, they don’t like that. They
prefer to put Pepsi or Diet Pepsi, or Cherry Pepsi, or Coke, and on the other side they know that by doing that,
they will support your competitor. Basically, their relationship is very weak and you have a lot of issues in
terms of execution. When you launch a line extension, your coverage is poor. Even within the Dr Pepper
system, maybe you have some pockets that are you executing well, but from a line-up of five SKUs, 10 SKUs
that you launch, only one or two are executed direct, very poor. I completely agree. You’re talking about Dr
Pepper or Canada Dry, that they are the core brand. It’s the only growth that you’re having in soft drinks,
honestly. These are the two brands that they are growing. The rest of the portfolio is losing market share,
losing execution, losing space. You are talking about 7 Up, that in the last 20 years they lost a lot of market
share against Sprite. We are talking about Crush, Sunkist, Schweppes, very bad performance.
[00:16:39]
Q: The distribution issue presumably isn’t confined to Dr Pepper – wouldn’t small start-ups also have trouble
if the weak distribution is controlled by a direct competitor? How has the overall industry responded to the
control over the distribution network? Has there been any regulatory push? Why isn’t this a bigger issue?
MM: That’s a great question. I think that you have to go back to the antitrust law, when Dr Pepper (inaudible
17.31) was sold. I think that nobody, Coke or Pepsi, due to the market share, could invite the company. That
they say, OK, Dr Pepper was a threat, is a threat for Coke and Pepsi because it’s a very strong, dark soft drink.
It is not a cola, but it’s dark, it is in the top five – always taking some volume from Coke and Pepsi, and say,
“OK. If I’m not going to own the brand, maybe I’m taking some part.” This is the situation. They don’t believe
in the brand. They don’t trust. They like to have part of the pie but to a certain limit. For a business vision it’s
not sustainable. You can do a lot of advertising, launch innovation that is not well-executed, that it wouldn’t be
available for all consumers in the country. You keep supporting the situation but long-term, you know that
Coke and Pepsi will prefer to put their own brand there. They will do it in coolers, in vendings. For Dr Pepper,
it’s every month to track what is happening, why it’s not having the coverage. It’s a very strange situation. It is
like having Canada Dry in three different systems to deliver to the same retailer. I’ll give you an example. In
the northeast, Stop & Shop, or Wegmans, they receive Canada Dry from direct system from Dr Pepper,
independent systems, Honickman and Coke, not New England. It’s crazy, different packages, different
execution, different P&L. If you like run one promotion with them, you have the coordinate with three
Private and confidential 5
different systems, different economics, some of them are losing money. They don’t execute. You have to check.
It’s not sustainable.
[00:19:49]
Q: Why is that Dr Pepper would go through multiple channels to the same place?
MM: All the contracts – you sign a contract with Pepsi Florida, and Publix has stores in Florida, but they have
stores in South Carolina and North Carolina, Virginia, and then you have Dr Pepper in the hands of other
bottlers, in other regions, so when you place an order for the whole chain, Publix has 1,200 stores across four
different states. Dr Pepper has different franchise contracts in those territories. The retailer has to understand
that Dr Pepper is the hands of, yes. Keurig Dr Pepper is the owner, but the route to market that is selling and
the invoice have different names and different execution and maybe different packages. That’s the point,
because of the contract, because of franchise contracts that you sign and it’s very expensive to buy back. You
say, “Oh, very easy.” You go to Coca Cola North New England and you buy back the rights. Yes, but you have to
pay a lot of money. Canada is selling well. Coke will have, the bottler will ask for a lot of money to give you
back the rights. It’s complicated because you inherited that. Keurig inherited all these situations when they
bought the company from Dr Pepper and then Cadbury Schweppes, when they bought Dr Pepper, they
inherited all the contracts, and the same with Snapple. Snapple Tea and all of this, has a fragmented
distribution, some of the small operators, they have the brand for life. That was the Snapple model. Once you
buy the brand, you inherited all this mess. In order to, you say, “OK, I like to buy back all the rights.” You have
to pay big money. Sometimes the money that the brand doesn’t deliver. This is another topic. Snapple brand
rights, distribution, the same. You have different operators through distributors selling to the same chain in
different states.
NH: What possible solutions are there? Where can the industry go to get out of this rabbit hole when it comes
to companies like that?
MM: I think that if Keurig likes to have a really, control of the route to market, they need to be aggressive and
buy back distribution rights for many operators, as they did with Honickman in New York. Because
Honickman’s execution was a disaster. They need to invest a lot of money. If they like to give a nice change to
the execution, but thinking about long-term, they will lose a lot of space. Retailers are not waiting for you. I
was in front of retailers telling me, “I don’t understand your system. I don’t like to hear more excuses. Either
you fix your system or I will take your brand out.” When you are a leader, you can make mistakes, but when
you are the third brand, they don’t need you. On the other side, Coke has flawless execution. Pepsi has strong
operators. They have Frito Lay, they are snacks and they beverages. Coke and Pepsi are in the top five
positions in many retailers in the US. Keurig is mainly combing coffee and beverages in the top 10, top 15 but
with very erratic execution. On the other side, you are taking money out of the system. You are not investing in
services. You are reducing frequency, reducing service, not buying information. in order to save in the last
year, Keurig’s leadership decided not to buy information from retailers. That was a big conflict, at least with
my retailer. You tell me that you would like to be top five prior partner, you’d like to be my partner, but on the
other side you are telling me that you are not buying my information? Come on, Coke and Pepsi are paying for
that. I don’t see a bright, short-term future for Keurig with their retailers in the US.
[00:25:27]
Q: How does the retailer relationship play into Keurig Dr Pepper’s innovation, especially if retailers play safe
with Coke and Pepsi in the soft drink segment? What are the considerations around the health and wellness
segment given there’s less competition but an increasing store presence? Target and ShopRite have whole
sections dedicated to better-for-you and health and wellness. How does Keurig Dr Pepper think about
innovation when approaching retailers and product allocation?
Private and confidential 6
MM: First of all, Dr Pepper, as I told you, maybe is not in the top list of preferred suppliers. Sometimes they
don’t even talk to you, in the soft drink part. For coffee, it’s a different thing but I will give you an overview of
coffee too. Sometimes you are not the first reference to talk. It’s Coke, Pepsi, Danone Water or Nestlé Water,
other companies in water. Dr Pepper used to have Fiji Water, they lost the distribution then they took Evian,
very complicated start. Now, in the water portfolio they have Evian, they have Core, they bought Core brands,
that is small. Overall, I don’t see a huge focus on health on wellness. Yes, you have Canada Dry seltzers, now
you sign a deal with Polar Seltzer as the distribution, but still, the company, they don’t fill the water category.
It’s a kind of tactic. Think about, that everything is about Dr Pepper, everything is about selling concentrate to
Coke and Pepsi, and growing Dr Pepper and Canada Dry. This is the core mindset. This is not a company with
huge innovation pipeline or health and wellness.
They moved from Nutrasweet sweeteners to Zero because of Coke Zero or Pepsi Zero. I launched Splenda or
sucralose in Mexico well ahead of the US. I was saying that consumers are moving to different sweeteners.
Even Dr Pepper, that I was doing fine, it was done with Nutrasweet. Not a big brand in water. Some alliance in
premium water or buying a small brand like Core, so very weak position in innovation. Then we got in coffee.
Coffee, Keurig is leading innovation in the machines. Now, I think that the new generation of coffee machines,
Keurig machines, are better, but very difficult to grow, very expensive. I don’t know if the company is making
money with them. Then, the trend is in coffee and K-cups, the private label trend is much faster and growing
three times than the brand itself. This is an issue in terms of profitability. Margins are going down even though
the company is looking for some private label contracts. If you see the growth in the category, it is coming
from private label, not from branded. This is a big strategic issue for Keurig, for the long term. How to make
Green Mountain, Peet’s Coffee, their own brands grow. When the growth is coming from private label and the
partners, Starbucks, Dunkin’ Donuts. I don’t see innovation. They did the recyclable K-cup, yes, some flavours,
seasonal flavour, but no innovation on the other side, too. This is my vision about innovation from Keurig Dr
Pepper.
[00:30:32]
Q: Could you expand on the success of Keurig’s coffee machines vs the coffee itself? Anecdotally, I don’t like
the taste of Keurig’s coffee so I buy Starbucks to use in a Keurig machine. What missteps would you highlight
around the quality of the actual coffee?
MM: I think that the coffee is very competitive. The source, Keurig has a procurement team, a global purchase
team in Switzerland buying coffee from everyone and the quality of the coffee is good. They are trying to do a
good job in terms of the quality of the coffee, responsible sourcing, recyclable K-cup, but the point is, I think
it’s a matter of brand. It’s a matter of pricing. I think they created their own monster. They created the private
label category. If you are selling your brand at USD 9 and on the same shelf you have the private label offering
almost the same product, the breakfast blend at USD 3, nope. Once Wegmans or ShopRite or Publix, once they
create their own brand, nobody will buy your brand at USD 9. You can grant a lot of promotions but once the
consumer moves to a nice private label and a good quality, because you are doing the same coffee, and it’s
almost the same quality, that’s the problem. That’s the pressure on margins. That’s the reason why. I think
that the strategy from Keurig is that taking money from soft drinks to support the lack of margin or the loss of
margin in coffee, overall I think this is the strategy. Of course, Starbucks, Dunkin’ Donuts, other brands, they
have better brands, better consumer preference and a good performance. When I left the company, the only
brands they were growing were the partners and the private labels – but 3x, it was double-digit growth vs flat.
[00:33:39]
Q: What are the upcoming opportunities in coffee?
MM: I think that the new machines, there are more offerings in terms of colours, more machines for college,
more smart machines with information. They can have information from consumers, direct from consumers, a
lot of insight. I think that this is the opportunity. Then, once you have you the penetration of the machine at
Private and confidential 7
home, you sell your K-cups. It doesn’t mean that you’re going to sell your branded K-cups. You are going to
sell private label, whatever. Allied brands, but at least you have your system there. The penetration is very low
comparing with Europe and comparing with other mature markets, the penetration is the US is very low.
Keurig has a lot of potential growth from household penetration of the systems. This is the main opportunity
but the concern is, maybe you’re not making money with the machines, and your K-cup business is going
down in markets. You have to invest a lot of money, e-commerce, or omni-channel, advertising in order to
defend your market share but you are going to lose share. The other thing is your production capability. Before
COVID, there were a lot of supply issues. The other tension and conflict relation with retailers is, Keurig was
really bad in service, in (inaudible 35.42) retail service. I suffer in my region from Publix, Arthur Davids
(inaudible 35.49), Wegmans. We were very bad in service. I think that the production capabilities didn’t catch
up with the growth that private label was having and I know that they are building a new plant. Still, double-
digit growth in the category, I think that they are still having big issues in service, in supply. This is another
problem. Once retailers lost trust in you, you are going to lose shelf space, they are going to give other brands
your space, and there is a big conflict internally in the company, once you have production limitations. Do you
give space to fulfil the private label that your re making one-third of the margin, or you fill a new supply, your
brand. You know that the retailer will complain about your obligation. That was one of the other issues that we
had at the end. I think that’s still an issue.
[00:37:16]
Q: To what extent has Keurig Dr Pepper leveraged its growth and retailer strength in coffee to gain more
exposure in other parts of the business? Did the company consider leveraging this market strength to build a
bigger presence in the soft drink segment?
MM: No, two different dynamics. Maybe they are strong in coffee, but let me give you some background.
Keurig companies didn’t build a good relationship with retailers. What I found starting work in Keurig is that
they left a very bad flavour with retailers, mainly because they created the category, they were the leaders, so
they built and arrogant position with many retailers. In my region, very bad relationship, all of them. Once we
became Keurig Dr Pepper, I think that on the contrary, soft drink relationships were better than coffee. We
helped coffee to gain some tracking and by having the soft drink leaders managing coffee. I think that they
gained some respect or reduced the tension. The commercial leadership that Keurig brought to the business,
the commercial head, for example, my leader in retail, their attitude is very arrogant, very aggressive with
retailers. I don’t see the heritage from coffee helping soft drinks at all, on the contrary. On top of that, you have
Coke and Pepsi in beverage. You have the two biggest suppliers for retailers, number one, number two, top five
suppliers, not only in the US, globally. I’ll give you an example. We tried to penetrate in Arthur Davids
(inaudible 39.57), top management, and they said, listen, we are not going to get into here because we are a
global company and you are not global – you are in the US. We talked to coke globally, we talked to Pepsi
globally. We are Arthur (inaudible 40.13). We are a European retailer, and you are not in Europe. Imagine
that. I don’t see that at all, for both reasons. You are not relevant for the retailer locally and globally and you
are arrogant.
[00:40:20]
Q: Could you elaborate on some of your comments about increasing efficiency and investing less in the retail
channel? How does it factor into Keurig Dr Pepper’s D2C approach and website or e-commerce build-out?
What is your outlook on the company’s strategy to focus on e-commerce and sales growth? Where will the
growth be?
MM: They developed an omni-channel team. They are pushing bottlers and retailers to understand that the
omni-channel, the e-commerce, it’s critical. They’re improving especially in the soft drink part. The growth is
coming from brands like Dr Pepper that still has distribution and opportunities or growing opportunities as
soft drink, as regular soft drink in the US, Canada Dry that enjoyed 10 years of growth and the halo for ginger
ale, and then, the orangeade and lemonade, all these, it is a better for you soft drink and mixer. The growth is
Private and confidential 8
coming from very weak, and I don’t see sustainable things. The strategy is, I think it’s a very short term
strategy, very short term. It’s taking money everywhere in the system. Efficiencies people, cost, reducing at the
limit not losing money in any delivery, in any system. Having a very thin structure. I’ll give you an example in
the commercial side. Yes. They executed a lot of lay off, and cutting people, but right now the people that are in
are doing three or four jobs. Imagine that one director, that it was leading supermarkets in the north-east, in
the past, that only soft drinks and Mott’s apple juice system, the warehouse direct. Now, they have soft drinks,
warehouse direct juices, branded coffee and private label. There are four different contracts. They are
struggling, and the quality of relationships, the time that they can dedicate to the team to the retailer is very
limited. On top of that you are losing frequency and execution. 80% of the time is solving issues, service issues,
out of stocks, then lack of supply because I told you that in coffee, big issues in services. I see that they can
make money cutting that and for the next 3-4 years, as they promised in the model, to find efficiencies. On the
commercial side, on the execution side, on the space, defendant space, it will be very challenging. They are
losing space. I was losing space in the majority of my retailers.
[00:44:43]
Q: What are the opportunities for Dr Pepper and Keurig’s global ambitions?
MM: I’m international, I was an international employee working in domestic. First of all, the last two leaders,
what they called international, first Dr Pepper and then Keurig, they were not international professionals. I’ll
give you an example, very clear example. They gave the international responsibility for people that didn’t have
any international exposure and experience. I am very clear about it. Mexico was part of Cadbury Schweppes.
Mexico was sold to Coca Cola. When Cadbury Schweppes sold international business to Coca Cola in 1999,
1998, ’99 and Mexico was part of the deal. Since the antitrust law of Mexico blocked the sale, Dr Pepper kept
Mexico as an accident, not because of a strategy. All the portfolios that you have in Mexico, Peñafiel water,
failed three times. It tried to launch in the US, or expand international. Then, Dr Pepper has an issue in terms
of expanding internationally because the majority of the countries, Coca Cola owns Dr Pepper. In South
America, from Central America to South America, Coca Cola owns Dr Pepper.
In Europe, only England, I think that you can sell Dr Pepper then. The rest of Europe, Suntory owns Dr
Pepper, or Australia Suntory owns Schweppes. Your portfolio, you cannot expand internationally, your
portfolio because you don’t know the brand. Snapple, they bought some rights, back many years ago, and they
have a very small export operation, I think, in Singapore, losing money. Honestly, Keurig doesn’t have any
international vision. Canada is Canada. Keurig has an operation. Canada, you serve a lot of Clamato brand that
is very profitable. Some franchise business, but very small operation. I think Canada is smaller than Mexico in
profit and Mexico is a very small operation. You are number three. You are not investing. You make money
and margin because you are making the business and not investing in market. I know Mexico very well.
Strategically it’s much better for Keurig to sell Mexico to Pepsi because they like this business for Squirt brand,
for many years. Squirt is one of the big brands in Mexico and Pepsi is the main bottler there. Peñafiel could be
a nice mineral water for Pepsi in Mexico, and use this money, USD 1bn, USD 800m, and use this money to buy
distribution systems in the US, Honickman, or improve your route to market.
I don’t see an international business, because within the Dr Pepper culture or the first generation of Keurig,
people, they don’t have international leaders. All of the new leaders are domestic. Very US-oriented and they
don’t have any strategy, honestly. They have to acquire somebody. One potential next step could be buy back
Schweppes in Spain, buy back all the Suntory business in Europe. Immediately you will have Schweppes, you
will have Dr Pepper, you will have Snapple, Europe and Australia. It could be one step, but I don’t know. South
America, buy back Dr Pepper from coke. Even Mexico, the coffee business is a disaster. They inherited a very
bad position in coffee, not only, you cannot execute beverages, you cannot execute coffee in Mexico, very
small. I don’t see any international strategy.
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[00:50:00]
Q: Which categories are trending positively in the US? What are your thoughts on Keurig expanding into one
of the new categories, such as seltzers or energy drinks, in a more efficient way? How have barriers to entry
changed in the beverage market for small start-ups and other competitors?
MM: I think seltzer and sparkling water is one nice example. For me, that was coming from different markets
and different cultures. It was a surprise to see how the category grew in the US. I gave you the example of
Polar agreement in distribution or La Croix, growing in Florida and other markets, or Canada Dry seltzer in
the north-east. Keurig buying back the distribution rights on Honickman in New York. I think if you think
(audio cuts out 51.36) the two actions. Signing an agreement with Polar sparkling water and buying back the
rights from Honickman in the Northeast. This is a good step for their position in the seltzer category. Polar
was the star growing nationally and doing fantastic in the north-east. Low price, very low margin but a lot of
volume and market share. Canada in seltzer was very strong. I think seltzer is a nice example. Again, you need
to fight for space, then you have Coke and Pepsi launching, Aha and Bubbly. You are not alone there. Yes,
maybe good steps, but late. You’ve been in the category, you have Canada seltzer and Schweppes seltzer,
sparkling water for a long time.
This could be a nice move. Then, RTB coffee, I know that they were trying, they bought some brands, Peet’s
brand. They own the agreement with Peet’s that is part of the JAB group. RTB coffee could be another
category. That could be a nice niche and trend to grow. Again, you are not alone. You have Starbucks, you have
Cafe au lait. In every category, you will have to compete with Coke and Pepsi. That’s the problem for them.
Energy drinks – you are launching some brand, you are launching some better-for-you brands in energy but
you have Fanta (inaudible 53.30), you have Monster. The example of BodyArmor, at the time that you have to
make the decision, buying or not BodyArmor, Coke bought it and it was in your system. That’s another
example. The power, who is really the leader and who has power. That’s reflected in the space in the shelves,
and that reflects the difficulty for other brands to get in this space. Retailers, they will give you a chance.
They will give you one space, but you have to pay slotting fees. I think that the US market is one of the most
difficult markets for new brands to get the chance to compete in the retailer. Of course, you have Walmart,
Albertson’s, Kroger, the national retailers and regional retailers. You have to pay a lot of money, big pockets
for getting one space. Then you have to compete with huge systems. That they will run promotions, they will
copy your offering. You have to have a very unique differentiated offering, affordable big margin, and good
money to invest in space in order to survive. It’s a totally different scenario that you have for example in Latin
America, Mexico than you, through sampling, through this traditional channel that is 80% of the channel of
the distribution channel. You can have a nice up and down distribution. You don’t have to pay slotting fees.
With good execution you have availability. You place coolers in the stores. The US is a different market, very
difficult. You have e-commerce of course. The chance, I think for new brands, start-ups, go straight to store, go
to homes, Amazon, e-commerce. I think that’s the biggest opportunity instead of thinking about having your
space in retailers.
[00:56:00]
Q: What could be the biggest threat to Coke and Pepsi given their US dominance, strong distribution pipeline,
balance sheet for innovation and entrenched retailer relationships? What could be a disrupting factor to those
industry leaders? What technical innovation could help disrupt the market?
MM: E-commerce, through innovation in a new category, sub-category within beverages. I don’t know,
functional, sparkling water, adding juice to the seltzers and creating a better-for-you. Short term, you can do
it. I did it in Mexico, I launched, under the Peñafiel brand, orangeade and lemonade. I had a couple of years
alone, then Coke and Pepsi came. I created a sub-category, that it was a flavoured sparkling water with juice,
very difficult. E-commerce, I think e-commerce, avoiding the retailers and the fight for the space, now you
have the buyers in every retailer, the category review, they review margin, selling, market share, investment,
who is supporting me in Thanksgiving, the Super Bowl, investing. The barriers of entry in the retailers are
huge. The only chance that you have is going through new channels, other channels. E-commerce now is the
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best option.
[00:58:32]
Q: Could you outline the sustainability and plastic issues and likely impact for big beverage companies?
MM: This is a key issue. Especially for many years, having the threat from government to impose taxes. This
is a lot of work behind recyclable plastic. In the coffee side for example, Keurig launched, all the K-cups are
now recyclable now, all across Canada and the US. Still, kind of plastic that is recyclable in some way, but a
good move. Regarding plastic bottles for soft drinks, I know that there a lot of efforts from the industry to
work together in order to collect all the plastic recyclable doing PET recyclable bottles, part of the bottle.
Moving to aluminium cans, slim cans, the same. Trying to do what is right for the environment and working
behind recyclable packaging. When you have a lot of million dollars invested behind plastic lines, and so far,
60-70% of the profit coming from plastic portfolio, I don’t see the company moving aggressively to glass or
recyclable PET, that they did in other markets in Europe, in South America. Then you have ugly bottles on the
shelf. If you got to Mexico and you see a recyclable PET, even recyclable glass, after 10, 20 trips, the bottle is
ugly. You have scuffing. I don’t see them moving aggressively in the short term.
[01:01:09]
NH: We will now end the Interview there. Let me just close by saying, thank you Mario. It was a great
Interview, tons of value add. Thank you clients for joining Third Bridge Forum’s Interview today. Goodbye.
MM: Goodbye.
Transcription ends at 01:01:25 of the recorded material
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